Receiving an on the spot penalty: A Tale of Morality, Common-sense and Law-abidance by Snow, AJ
 1 
 
Title: Receiving an on the spot penalty:  A Tale of Morality, Common-sense and Law-abidance  
Key Words: Common-sense, Legal psychology, Law-Abidance, on the spot penalties, Motoring 
Adam Snow, School of Social Science, Liverpool Hope University, Childwall, Liverpool, L16 
9JD 
Phone: 01512913507 
Email: snowa@hope.ac.uk 
Adam Snow is a Lecturer in Criminology at Liverpool Hope University and specialises in 
research in the areas of road policing, regulation, law abidance, procedural justice and policing 
particularly at the lower end of criminality 
Word count: 8997 
 
Abstract 
This article examines citizens’ reactions to being issued with an on the spot penalty and the 
consequences this has for holding a law-abiding identity.  Using mundane examples of statutory 
requirements regulating everyday life (motoring), it is found that people use common-sense 
purposive reasoning in their interpretation of law which does not match the actual black letter law 
application of the specific statutes.  The lack of congruence between the purposive 
understandings of legal requirements and the black letter application of enforcement agencies 
allows citizens to maintain a moral position that is aligned with the aims of the law but not its 
actual requirements.  This process reaffirms a belief in law-abidance even where the citizen has 
been found to break the law. 
Introduction 
If the average individual encounters authority as a wrongdoer they are more than likely to receive 
an on the spot penalty notice (hereafter OTSP) as a result.  Many jurisdictions use the OTSP, 
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including common law systems such as Australia, the USA and Canada, and civil law systems 
such as Germany, France and Italy.  This paper examines the perspectives of OTSP recipients 
in England and Wales, their experience of receiving such penalty and the impact this has on 
citizens’ claims to be “law-abiding”. 
OTSPs are a ubiquitous penalty for offending at the lower of end of seriousness, particularly for 
motoring offending.  The procedures and legal foundations may differ depending on jurisdiction, 
and penalty type, but the underlying principle is the same: they are a mechanism for imposing a 
financial penalty for legal contravention without the need to go to court.  An officer (police or other 
enforcement agent) issues a charge (from £30 upwards) which requires the recipient to pay the 
penalty within a specified period.  If the penalty is paid then the matter is not referred to the courts.  
If the penalty remains unpaid then the traditional enforcement route takes over (either through the 
criminal courts, or via debt collection in the case of most unpaid parking tickets).  
OTSPs are used to punish problematic (and mundane) everyday activities such as driving, or 
parking, a motorcar or dealing with one’s rubbish.  In terms of criminal law OTSPs, the number 
issued each calendar year is largely unknown due to the diffusion of enforcement amongst an 
array of agencies and the lack of centralised statistical collation.  Table 1.1 gives a small sample 
of behaviours that can attract an OTSP and an indication of the number of OTSPs issued in the 
latest year for which statistics are available. 
  
 3 
 
Table 1.1 The number of OTSPs issued for a cross section of offences 
Description Legislation Enforcement 
Agency 
Number of OTSPs 
Issued (Year Ending 
March) 
Truancy Education Act 1996 Head 
Teacher / 
Deputy Head 
151,125 (DFE, 2015) 
Obtaining a free 
prescription without a valid 
exemption certificate 
 
National Health 
Services Act 2006 
NHS 
Business 
Services 
Authority 
430,971 (Hansard, 
2015a) 
Penalty Notices for 
Disorder 
Criminal Justice and 
Police Act 2001 
Police (and 
accredited 
persons) 
43,373 (MOJ, 2016) 
Moving Traffic Violations 
(Speeding, Red Light etc.) 
 
Road Traffic Act 1988 Police 1,022,352 (Home 
Office, 2016) 
Late Licensing Penalty 
(Untaxed Vehicles without 
SORN) 
Vehicle Excise and 
Registration Act 1994 
DVLA 480,790 (Hansard, 
2015b) 
Litter, Graffiti, Dog fouling 
Waste 
Environmental 
Protection Act 1990 
Local 
Authorities 
72,136 (Appleton, 
2012)1 
 Sub-Total  2,200,747 
 
Local Authority Penalty 
Charge Notices (Parking 
Tickets) 
Associated Road 
Traffic Regulations 
Local 
Authorities 
8,010,194 (TPT & 
London Councils, 2015) 
Local Authority Bus Lane 
and Box Junction 
Enforcement 
Road Traffic 
Regulation Act 1984 
Local 
Authorities 
2,711,595 (TPT & 
London Councils, 2015) 
Total 12,922,536 
 
This wide array of agencies enforce, through the OTSP, over 250 criminal offences and civil 
breaches.  Not all of these 250 offences/breaches are automatically enforced through the OTSP.  
For instance, the much publicised ban on smoking in vehicles with a child passenger has only 
                                               
1 The Coalition government stopped collecting centralised local government fixed penalty 
notices post 2010 (Ostensibly for reasons of “transparency” (Pickles, 2010)).  The figures 
reported here are taken from a series of Freedom of Information requests by the Manifesto Club 
in their report ‘Pavement Injustice’ (Appleton, 2012).  
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resulted in one OTSP being issued (Smith & Lancefield, 2016).  Instead the creation of an 
opportunity to issue an OTSP, if not the actual issuing, seems to be the reflex reaction of the 
criminal justice system to minor offending (Morgan, 2011).   
As Table 1.1 demonstrates, OTSPs represent a significant proportion of justice encounters in 
England and Wales.  Ignoring parking violations for the moment, the total figure for OTSPs issued 
(2,200,747) is close to the number of all other actions in the criminal justice system for 2016 
(arrest, caution, community resolution, prosecution) (2,664,347 (Home Office, 2016)).  If one 
includes awareness courses, offered as an alternative to an OTSP2, then the number of disposals 
is more than all other formal criminal justice actions (1,403,555 motoring awareness courses were 
attended in 2015 (NDORS, n.d.)).   
Problematic motoring, by ostensibly law-abiding citizens, is the main driver of OTSP enforcement.  
On average 9 million parking penalties3 are issued each year and represent the most common 
punishment (and OTSP) by a factor of 5.  When the number of Penalty Charge Notices (hereafter 
PCNs) issued each year are included, which but for a series of road traffic acts would constitute 
a criminal offence, the number of OTSPs issued exceeds 12 million each year.  This represents 
a major means through which regulatory and criminal justice is experienced.  If local authority 
PCNs are included then the OTSP displaces courts as the main location of punishment in the 
justice system, justice is now delivered on the street and through the post. 
With most OTSP offences the criminal law aspect of the “offence” is straightforward; it refers to 
specific conduct criminalised by statute.  However, with parking enforcement, “offence” is a 
                                               
2 Such courses are offered as alternative to the OTSP and are generally a cheaper option but 
with the requirement to attend.  Courses are available as alternatives for speeding, red light, 
mobile phone use, etc. 
3 This does not include penalties issued by private companies for parking on private land for 
which there are no reliable statistics. 
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problematic term.  Originally parking transgressions were enforced through the criminal law but 
were “decriminalised” for London authorities under the Road Traffic Act 1991.  Instead of 
prosecution for the underlying offence the “penalty charge” was recovered in the civil courts if it 
remained unpaid.  This was subsequently extended by the Traffic Management Act 2004 to all 
local authorities who adopted the provisions4.  
This “decriminalisation” process has been described by White as a ‘pernicious hypocrisy’ 
(2009:112).  White (2011), using Thornton’s analysis of penal provisions (1996), argues that 
parking OTSPs are criminal provisions that the state has artificially labelled as a civil sanction.  
Accordingly, we should consider such penalties as part of the criminal law, even if the process 
differs from criminal justice OTSPs, because the state is still exercising its legal powers to 
regulate/control individuals through punishment5. 
Why OTSPs? 
It may be asked why seemingly obvious offences/breaches, such as illegal parking, speeding or 
running a red light, require an examination of the mind-set of offenders.  As shall be demonstrated, 
the obviousness of the law is frequently lost in translation from statute book to the streets.  As 
Woolgar and Neyland (2013) state, governance of simple activities (like local authority waste 
collection) is ‘characterized by messiness and indeterminacy’ (2013:71).  For enforcement 
professionals this messiness is easily rectified through black-letter interpretation of legal 
provisions.  In black-letter law the question of offending is dichotomous, either one broke the law 
or one did not, (one was exceeding the speed limit or one was not, for example) however, as 
                                               
4 Although some local authorities still resort to the criminal law to enforce parking offences 
under the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984.  As of writing approximately 330 local authorities 
have adopted Decriminalised Parking Enforcement (DPE). (August, 2017) 
5 Though sometimes indirectly through contracted-out private sector enforcement 
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Finkel states, ‘citizens see greater nuance and gradations to culpability, and make finer 
distinctions, than black-letter law either sees or sanctions.’ (1996:15)  
Cressey (1953) and Sykes and Matza (1957) have helped shape our understanding of individual 
responses to deviance (as offenders).  Furthermore, there is extensive research which seeks to 
make sense of “justifications” for delinquent behaviour (Maruna & Copes, 2005).    Sykes and 
Matza’s five techniques can be seen in minor offending (Minor, 1981) and they reflect an attempt, 
on the behalf of the offender, to change ‘the subject of the conversation in the dialogue between 
his own deviant impulses and the reactions of others.’ (Sykes and Matza, 1957:668).  By changing 
the subject of the dialogue ‘the wrongfulness of his own behavior is more easily repressed or lost 
to view.’ (ibid: 668).   
Darley et al examine the problem of understanding crime from a different direction, examining the 
‘ex-ante function of the criminal law’ (2001: 165).  They do so in order ‘to determine whether 
people are aware of the lines drawn by legal codes’ (ibid: 166).  Darley et al would argue that 
changing of the “dialogue” is not necessarily a means of ‘drift’ (Matza, 1964) or justification (Scott 
and Lyman, 1968) but a genuine perplexity at having found themselves on the wrong side of the 
law. This perplexity is hardly surprising given the growth of regulation (Stuntz, 2001) particularly 
at the minor end of criminality (Morgan, 2011).  Ignorance is no defence in law, but one dare say 
it is a sociological fact, as the statistics above (table 1.1) suggest.   
Kahan & Nussbaum (1996) make a convincing philosophical argument that moral reasoning 
should play a higher part in our understanding of law, rather than adherence to the perfect 
strictures of the law.  Indeed, Jackson et al (2012) demonstrate that moral alignment with the law 
is a good predictor of compliance, and particularly with traffic law (Bradford et al 2015).  From an 
empirical perspective, such moral reasoning is the primary way whereby citizens understand their 
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legal obligations.  As Darley et al note  ‘people often generate their perceptions of what the law 
of the state must be from what they think is the morally appropriate form for that law to take’ 
(2001:183).   As demonstrated below this moral debate revolves around notions of common-
sense, and common-sense interpretations of legal codes.  
The Mind-set of Offenders  
A significant portion of offences/breaches that attract an OTSP are strict liability, particularly traffic 
violations (Fox, 1995).   The move towards strict liability with regulatory fines is consistent with a 
focus on risk as the main driver of legality (Feeley and Simon, 1992; Kemshall 2003, O’Malley, 
2010).  Strict liability regulations are those that require no mental element (mens rea) in the 
definition of wrongdoing; and as Wells states ‘issues such as intent, culpability and mitigation 
become irrelevant’ (Wells, 2012: 262).  The minor nature of the offending, and the embedding of 
these laws in mundane everyday life, mean that ‘law-abiding individuals who never intended to 
break laws can nonetheless be punished as law-breakers.’ (Wells, 2007:2).   
O’Malley further claims that OTSPs, and fines, are reflective of a consumer society (2009).  Thus, 
breaking the law and receiving an OTSP should, for O’Malley, be experienced as an ‘occasion 
lacking moral opprobrium’ (ibid,108).  Despite the claim of lacking moralisation, the activities 
regularly undertaken by ostensibly “law-abiding” citizens may still technically be a crime and 
require criminological and socio-legal investigation (Ross, 1960; Woolgar & Neyland, 2013).  
Furthermore, as Wells notes individuals caught breaking the law (speeding) make a distinction 
‘between the type of law-abiding offenders created by risk assessments and strict liability legal 
practices, and genuinely intentionally criminal individuals’ (2007:6).  Moreover, even in risk based 
regimes (such as speeding or parking) there are still moral judgements being made, by both the 
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law and society, about the individual in question ‘given that they relate to judgements about 
desirable and undesirable outcomes’ (ibid, 2007:3). 
The law-abiding/intentionally criminal distinction is an important dimension of understanding the 
response of citizens to being labelled a problem by the law.  This is particularly so if we want to 
understand the complex claims being made when a citizen asserts that they are law-abiding.  This 
article builds on these claims of moral judgement by asking recipients of OTSPs directly about 
their experiences and notes the ways in which responses draw on moral arguments and 
perspectives.   
Mundanity and Anomie 
Woolgar and Lezuan, in their investigation of kerbside recycling, find that the mundane 
governance of simple items, like the “bin bag”, are open to an array of ontologies that create moral 
dilemmas. Characterising the object as mundane, they argue, serves to typify the regulatory 
issues that flow from the object as moral issues.  Thus, authorities that enforce waste legislation 
can be viewed as “jobsworths” or “crazy” due to the complexity of the regulation considering the 
objects mundanity. 
The mundanity of the bin bag – what every reasonable (normal) person knows about the 
nature and purpose of bin bags – reinforces [a] moral contrast … what the thing is, what 
it is for, what should be in it and what is (in)appropriate behaviour towards it are all tied 
to (and exemplify) the structure of the moral order. (Woolgar and Lezaun, 2013: 332) 
Similar claims can be made about the OTSP.  In many respects it is a small financial penalty that 
most can afford to pay6 and should not excite much interest from those who receive them, those 
                                               
6 This is not to denigrate the hardship caused to some through the issuing of an OTSP, where 
the decision may very well be between food, rent or a financial penalty 
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who issue them or academics interested in punishment. However, the potential moral dimensions 
that the OTSP creates are ripe for criminological and socio-legal investigation.  The legal 
definitions of problematic behaviour that the penalty implies are interesting since, as Karstedt and 
Farrall claim, ‘crimes of the everyday... are indicative of the moral state of society’ (2006: 1012).  
Thus moral intuitions about law, and the objects’ that represent legal punishment, not only tell us 
something interesting about the sociological function of law but also about the criminological 
significance of law abidance where the law is frequently flouted. 
Karstedt and Farrall (2006) explain non-law-abidance through the ‘syndrome of market anomie’ 
(2006: 1017) which drives people to a position of ‘distrust, insecurity and specifically anomic 
attitudes toward legal rules’ (ibid).  They argue that “shady” and immoral practices in the markets 
transfer onto consumers who then also engage in morally and legally dubious behaviour.  It is 
worth recalling O’Malley’s claim here that OTSPs operate according to consumer rationales, and 
thus perceived immoral practices and distrust by those who govern us may lead to a form of 
market anomie in our relations vis-a-vis public enforced regulations.  Indeed, one could note the 
oft repeated argument that OTSPs represent “revenue raising” as evidence of institutionalised 
market anomie (Rosenfeld and Messner, 1995; Karstedt and Farrall, 2006)) in which the organs 
of the state commodify the action of punishment (Rusche & Kirkheimer, 2003; O’Malley, 2009).   
How then are we to make sense of citizens’ perceptions of themselves as law abiders whilst they 
simultaneously break the law?  Arguably such perceptions are far from the state of normlessness 
envisaged by anomie theory.  OTSP recipients instead engage in moral reasoning that is 
coherent, at times persuasive, and accords with the purposes of legislative provisions, if not the 
black-letter requirements. Here it is not the syndrome of market anomie that motivates moral 
reasoning but “commonsense justice” (Finkel, 1995) and telos (Sandel, 2009) that operate as 
moral heuristics (Sunstein, 2005) for the question of whether a citizen is law-abiding.  
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Many will have reservations about the claim that morality plays an important part in law, and 
indeed it is not my intention to re-argue the Fuller-Hart debate (see Lacey, 2008). Instead what is 
argued is, much like Darley et al (2001), morality has a socio-legal significance.  Put simply, 
citizens use moral reasoning to interpret legislation, and use it to interpret the law in a manner 
that maintains the perpetrator was complying (or certainly was complying with the kind of “law” 
that is meant when people use the term “law-abiding”).  To paraphrase from Kahan and 
Nussbaum, these citizens are arguing that ‘ignorance of the law is a defence but only for the 
virtuous.’ (Kahan & Nussbaum, 1997: 127).  Such virtue is determined through a process of moral 
reasoning that is sensitive to the purposes for which the law is intended. 
Methods: 
The focus on understanding, experience and the discussion, as well as contestation, of law-
abidance called for a qualitative inquiry.  As Gerson and Horowitz (2002) point out ‘people 
experience their lives not as a set of variables, but rather as the unfolding events, perceptions 
and feelings over time’ (2002: 208).  The unfolding of one’s identity is a lifelong process (Erikson, 
1980) and thus to capture identities, and identity construction, one needs to capture the 
experiential happenings that give meaning to that identity.   
The data below was drawn from a larger study conducted between 2012 and 2014, which 
examined the meaning, use and experience of OTSPs.  The study used a variety of qualitative 
methods including focus groups and interviews of OTSP recipients.    
Focus groups were used to see whether participants made a distinction between their offending 
and the potentially more serious (or at least “different”) offending of another participant. In that 
regard participants were grouped together based on the nature of their transgression.  Thus, 
speeders and those who ran red lights were paired with parking over-stayers as well as those 
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who obstructed the highway.  In effect those who had breached safety related regulations were 
paired with those who breached traffic management related ones (the former potentially being 
perceived as more serious).   
There are ethical sensitivities when asking participants about their offending behaviour in a group 
setting and this was closely monitored.  Prior to participation all participants were asked, 
separately, if they consented to taking part knowing that they would be discussing their behaviour 
with others who might object to such “criminality”.  No participant objected and all signed consent 
forms.   
Following the focus groups a series of qualitative interviews were conducted with different 
participants to examine, in greater depth, emerging themes of identity, fairness and law abidance 
raised in focus groups.  These interviews sought to capture ‘how large scale social 
transformations are experienced, interpreted and ultimately shaped by the responses of strategic 
social actors’ (Gerson and Horowitz, 2002: 201).  At the start of the interview each participant was 
asked about their previous interactions, for problematic behaviour, with enforcement agencies.  
No participants had previous interactions other than for OTSP traffic related offending (both 
parking and moving traffic).   
The strategic social actors (in both focus groups and interviews) here were those who could be 
characterised as the ‘problematic citizen’.  Those who, to quote Karstedt and Farrall (2006),  
‘think of themselves as respectable citizens, and who would definitely reject the labels of 
‘criminals’ and ‘crime’ for themselves and their actions. Politicians refer to them as the 
‘law abiding majority in this country’, ignoring the fact that the majority does not abide by 
the law, or at least is highly selective in when to comply and when not to’ (2006: 1011) 
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The idea of being a law-abiding citizen was of more evidential value than traditional notions of 
identity such as race, class, age or gender.  It was important to examine how those who felt they 
were part of the “law-abiding majority” responded to an OTSP and how they related this to the 
idea of being law-abiding. Asking about previous experiences of punishment isn’t a proxy for “law 
abidingness” in an objective sense, in that all could have led criminal lifestyles without being 
caught, in subjective terms it alluded to idea that leading a life free from “trouble”, or official notice 
of an enforcement agency, leads one to believe that one is “law-abiding”.  
To analyse the meaning recipients attributed to receiving the OTSP (in both focus groups and 
interviews) a narrative method was used.  Narrative’s importance lies in its embeddedness in 
ordinary life (Langellier, 2001).  The narratives people tell ‘respond […] to the disintegration of 
master narratives as people make sense of experience, claim identities, and ‘get a life’ by telling 
and writing their stories’ (Ibid:700).  The master narrative of law-abidance emerged from the focus 
groups and is a challenge to recipients who, from a black-letter interpretation, are clearly not law-
abiding.  To capture the meaning of law abidance for those who have been confronted by authority 
when not abiding by the law, narrative can help make sense of recipients’ claims.   
Polkinghorne states that ‘“truths” sought by narrative researchers are “narrative truths,” not 
“historical truths”’ (2007: 479), meaning the sense in which the narrative is truthful does not 
depend on the facts of the story, but on the place of the story in exemplifying theoretical 
constructs.  Thus, the claim to be law-abiding is not taken at face value, almost all of the recipients 
freely admitted that they had “technically” done what was claimed, but had justifications ready for 
maintaining a “law-abiding” identity.  
Obtaining Participants 
Given the breadth of behaviour that can attract an OTSP the participant call was wide and asked 
for participation based on experience of receiving any OTSP.  Several routes for study 
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advertisement were followed; advertisements on social media and various forums including 
motoring, football and student forums were used as well as a network of acquaintances and 
snowballed contacts.  The overall experience of recruiting recipients of OTSPs was difficult and 
frustrating, much like Fox found in his 2003 study of infringement notices (an OTSP) in Victoria, 
Australia; several recipients simply failed to show after initially expressing a desire to be involved, 
and subsequently ignored further contact.   In total 20 recipients took part in five focus groups 
ranging from three to five participants in each group. A further 10 in-depth interviews were 
arranged with different recipients to explore themes that had arisen as part of the focus groups.  
18 males, and 12 females took part, only one interview was from a BAME (Black and Ethnic 
Minority) background.  Tables 1.2 and 1.3 list the number of participants in each method and the 
OTSP(s) they had received. 
Table 2.2 Recipient Interviews 
Penalty Notice Number of Interviews 
Penalty Notice for Disorder (hereafter PND) 3 (Male) 
PCN 3 (2 male, 1 female)  
Fixed Penalty Notice (motoring) (hereafter 
FPN) 
4 (2 male, 2 female)  
 
Table 1.3 Focus Group Participants  
Focus Group Number Number of Participants OTSPs 
1 4 (3 female, 1 male) 2 x PCN, 2 x FPN  
2 3 (3 female) 2 x PCN, 1 x FPN Motoring 
3 6 (6 male) 6 x FPN Motoring, 2 x PCN 
4 3 (2 male, 1 female) 2 x FPN Motoring, 1 x PCN 
5 4 (2 male, 2 female) 3 x FPN Motoring, 1 x PCN 
 
In reporting the quotes below each participant is identified with a pseudonym, approximate age 
and the method used to obtain the data. 
Moral Reasoning and OTSPs 
 14 
 
During the focus groups all participants, rather than accusing others of falling short of acceptable 
behaviour, were united in seeing their behaviour as barely problematic and certainly not as 
problematic as the behaviour of the agency issuing the penalty. In both the focus groups and 
interviews there emerged a largely cohesive sense of injustice about the process regardless of 
the “seriousness” of the transgression.   Similarly across the interviews participants subscribed to 
the idea that, although their behaviour may have breached the law, it was a “technicality” which 
didn’t impact on their identity as law-abiding.   
It was only 35 and in my mind whether I was right or wrong, in my mind I didn’t deserve 
that punishment. (‘Jenny’, Late 30s. Focus Group) 
I don’t think mine was fair, I think it could have been handled differently (‘Dave’, Early 
40s, Focus Group) 
There is this sense there that this enforcement is going on is very unfair (‘Parker’, Early 
20s, Focus Group) 
A frequent refrain of recipients, regarding this unfairness, was that the enforcing body lacked 
“common-sense”. 
I don’t trust them [wardens] to exercise any discretion or common-sense, or whatever 
else, or any kind of civil behaviour. (‘Peter’, Early 40s, Interview)  
Some police officers do abuse them (OTSPs), rather than using common sense… I don’t 
think there was any common sense, I think the coppers were just bored (‘John’, Mid 20s, 
Interview) 
Common-sense reasoning is a heuristic process (Perlin, 1990) and one that can lead us all into 
error (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986; Lilienfeld, 2010).  Nevertheless, it has a power to explain our 
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behaviour and understanding of legal problems (Finkel, 1995) and for Peter and John it was a 
concept that clearly had explanatory potential. 
Finkel argues for a dual conception of law, between the black-letter law that ‘law students study, 
judges interpret, and jurisprudes analyze’ (1995:2) - and what he calls “commonsense justice”, 
which ‘reflects what ordinary people think is just and fair... It is what ordinary people think the law 
ought to be.’ (ibid: 2). Finkel argues that the “black-letter” approach is unduly restrictive and does 
not accord with common notions of justice.   
‘The law [black-letter] seems to freeze the frame at the moment of the act and then zoom 
in on a specific set of determinative variables, the commonsense context, like a motion 
picture, conveys action before, during, and even after the moment of the act. (Ibid: 319) 
The idea that the law acts as a freeze-frame is interesting in the OTSP system where many of the 
breaches are strict liability.  The facts of the case, generally objective facts about appearance or 
presence, are suitable for a freeze-frame legal approach.  Capturing a car driving through a 
prohibited area or driving at excess speed are the determinative variables that can be captured 
in freeze frame instances.  Furthermore technology, specifically cameras, in motoring 
enforcement prove the case without need to consider the motion picture aspects of that activity 
(what happened next, intentions, purposes etc.).  
A simple Google search of press reports relating to bus-lane enforcement captures examples of 
freeze-frame legality operated by enforcement agencies.  These cases involve cars moving into 
bus lanes to make way for emergency vehicles, only to find an OTSP arrive a few days later (see 
Parry, 2015).  The camera freezes the instant transgression, based on the determinative variable 
‘presence of a vehicle in a bus lane, not being a bus’, without considering important countervailing 
aspects of the case.  The common-sense justice approach advocated by Finkel, would require, 
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at least, an appreciation of the surrounding circumstances for presence in the bus lane.  Such an 
approach reflects an Aristotelian approach to justice; one that is concerned with “telos” (‘defining 
rights requires us to figure out the telos (the purpose, end, or essential nature) of the social 
practice in question’) (Sandel, 2009:186).  Thus, in bus lane cases it would require a teleological 
appreciation of the practice of driving (i.e. moving aside to let emergency vehicles pass) and “the 
bus lane”, the purpose of the bus lane and the circumstances under which it is necessary to 
invoke the idea of the bus lane which is not compatible with automated enforcement. 
Teleological Parking 
Recipients of OTSPs wanted to explain the set of circumstances that led to the “instant” of 
transgression.  However, they feel that authorities are not interested in what they have to say 
because of the regulation’s “black and white” nature: 
I do remember talking to the chap about this, he said ‘look the bottom line is you can’t be 
parked on double yellow lines, … any time you try and fudge it a bit that is opening the 
door for all’ so I figured yes that is a very straightforward way of looking at it, either it is 
against the rules or it isn’t.  (‘Jivan’, Early 20s, Interview) 
In this instant, we can see that automatic black-letter law enforcement of parking is not limited to 
camera related cases.  Officers themselves operate according to a black-letter interpretation, 
forgoing their discretion in favour of certainty.   
The recipient was fortunate in that he saw the Civilian Enforcement Officer issuing the notice and 
discussed his case.  Many recipients will have no human interaction whatsoever.  However what 
Jivan gets in response is a black-letter approach (“the bottom line”), which excludes discussion 
of the common-sense interpretation of the problem (“either it is against the rules or it isn’t.”) 
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 [It] didn’t make sense and that ticket was in the same vein, because there was just such 
a negligible margin between me getting a ticket and not getting a ticket, especially when 
over 90% of the vehicle [was] fine [i.e. not on the double yellow lines.] (‘Jivan’, Early 20s, 
Interview) 
The idea “that ...didn’t make sense” reinforces the notion of a perceived gulf in common-sense 
understanding between enforcement agencies and recipients.  Recipients may believe that laws 
are passed with a purpose and that they are enforced with that purpose in mind.  However, as 
they find out, by receiving an OTSP, the purposes of the law do not always apply to their situation. 
Road traffic regulation is subject to limitations contained within the Road Traffic Regulation Act 
(RTRA) 1984.  The RTRA permits local authorities to conduct regulation in accordance with 
specified aims.  These are: 
• Avoiding danger or risk of danger to persons or traffic  
• Prevention of damage to road or building 
• Facilitating passage of traffic 
• Prohibiting unsuitable vehicles having regard to character 
• Preserving character of area for pedestrians or horseback 
• Preserving or improving amenities 
However, when enforcing the legislation these purposes are unimportant.  Authorities are not 
concerned, at the point of enforcement, with marrying the particularities of the breach with the 
telos of road traffic regulation.  Instead they focus on the literal interpretation of the legal 
provisions that are created.  The purposes are important in creating legal relationships between 
the authority and the citizen, but once those relationships have been created the introductory 
purpose loses relevance. 
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This black-letter approach eschews moral reasoning, the regulation exists and is punished without 
consideration of the surrounding circumstances.   
I did actually display the ticket but the ticket fell off.  I did challenge it, they still made me 
pay (‘Milly’, Early 20s, Focus Group) 
Sometimes I feel like they... it’s either black or white, they don’t see the shades in between 
…they just don’t accept any story other than their own.  It is like you didn’t have a ticket 
so can’t have had a ticket kind of thing (‘Mabel’, Late 30s, Focus Group) 
Milly’s claim also alludes to the complex morality and ontology of the mundane parking ticket.  As 
Woolgar & Lezaun (2013) note, mundane objects, such as bin bags (and in Milly’s case the 
parking ticket), provoke a ‘struggle over what … is appropriate and inappropriate behaviour in 
relation to what the thing actually is and who or what should act in what ways towards it.’ (2013: 
334) By purchasing the ticket Milly believes she has brought the social act of parking to its 
conclusion.  The ticket’s existence represents the completion of the legal relationship between 
herself and the local authority, and absent any wrongful parking or overstay, she has complied 
with the law.  The authority, conversely, rejects this purposive construction in favour of a stricter 
interpretation that focuses on the law as written and builds the ontological status of legitimate 
parking around this.  For the authority, the law is not focused on purposes or intentions but on the 
determinative variable of displaying a ticket.  Purchasing the ticket is a separate, though 
nevertheless important, variable.  Unfortunately, for Milly, it is not the determinative variable.  
Thus, for Milly a parking ticket is something to be purchased, for the local authority it is something 
to be purchased and displayed in an appropriate manner. 
Milly is experiencing the increasing practice of local authorities focusing on all elements of the 
regulation, a prototypical black-letter law approach.  The black letter interpretation of “pay and 
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display” is conjunctive: pay and display, it is not enough to pay, one must also continuously 
display.  This ontological reading of the parking ticket (as something to be paid for and displayed) 
engenders a real concern about fairness, as the Traffic Penalty Tribunal have noted: ‘’a real sense 
of grievance arises where the appellant paid to park, but there is a dispute about the display of 
the ticket.’ (TPT, 2010:4) 
A further example of the black-letter approach arises in “display” cases involving blue badge 
holders (disability parking concessions).  The blue badge entitles holders to park in certain 
locations otherwise prohibited to general traffic. 
I parked where I normally parked overnight, but had taken my badges out because it had 
been cleaned.  I was playing with the kids and forget to put it back in...  I got a ticket and 
I asked them to cancel it but they weren’t bothered.  They said I had to display it and that 
was it… (‘Malcolm’, Early 40s, Interview) 
Parking regulations are mala prohbita; they require no proof of harm or intent which allows for the 
literal approach to interpretation, involving continuous display of the concession/ticket.  For the 
recipient, however, this can seem unjust, since they have the right to park, by having a 
concession, have not deprived anyone of space to which they were entitled, but merely have not 
exhibited the correct paperwork.  As Malcolm stated: 
I hadn’t done anything wrong really, just forgot to put the badges back in. (ibid) 
For “failure to display” recipients the moral understanding, and ontological existence, of their 
parking activities relates specifically to a conception of law that is bounded by the telos of the 
regulatory regime.  
In the following examples, the recipients criticise enforcement activity that does not allow for a 
teleological examination of parking restrictions 
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Although you’re not in the lines, you’re not blocking anyone… while doing that, I parked 
and got ticket.  (‘Katie’, Late 20s, Focus Group) 
I was on a kerb and they said I was blocking, obstructing the passage….  As far as I could 
see you could fit a tank… never mind an ambulance or fire engine…I wasn’t convinced 
by their argument and their reason for putting a ticket on there (‘Steven’, Late 20s, Focus 
Group) 
Here the “problem” to be enforced, in the recipients’ view, is not whether they have technically 
committed the breach; ‘not in the lines’ or ‘on the curb’, but whether they have actually 
contravened the purpose to which the law is addressed.  The reasoning adopted by these 
recipients is not anomic, in the Karstedt and Farrall sense, they do not claim to be acting from a 
position of ‘distrust, insecurity and specifically anomic attitudes toward legal rules’ (2006:1017).  
They are sensitive to purposive constructions of the law which, recipients think, hold them to 
higher ideals of law-abidingness than objective abidance with a regulation. 
Teleological Motoring 
Similarly, in police moving traffic enforcement, claims of lacking common-sense and appeals to 
teleological reasoning are made: 
I wasn’t treated with any initiative or common-sense, because there is the letter of the law 
and… the spirit of the law, [when he received a previous notice from an actual police 
officer, not camera enforced] that police officer knew the difference, he knew I wasn’t a 
speeder although I had been speeding, he knows that it was a misunderstanding and I 
probably won’t do it again (‘Jim’, Early 30s, Interview) 
In Jim’s case it is the technological facilitation of the OTSP that lacks common-sense.  As Wells 
argues ‘techno-fix’ (speed camera) leaves recipients wanting ‘a more contextualised and 
 21 
 
inconsistent treatment’ (2008:814).  Jim is requesting a personal encounter, so that the officer 
can understand the teleological argument he makes, ‘the spirit of the law’ rather than ‘the letter 
of the law.’ 
Jim’s claim demonstrates the moral reasoning process when receiving an OTSP.  Typically, such 
penalties are received through the post, or on the vehicle, rather than in person. There is no 
opportunity to explain the broad contextual circumstances of the situation (and indeed if there 
was an interaction it is unlikely the officer would engage in such a discussion in any event due to 
the black-letter nature of the regulations).  Jim’s reasoning for perceiving the penalty to be unfair 
relates to his moral standing as not a ‘speeder’.  The enforcement of speeding should be reserved, 
Jim suggests, for those who are “speeders” and thus “law-abiding” (purposively constructed) 
motorists, such as himself, should avoid punishment.  A moral heuristic (Sunstein, 2005) has 
operated for Jim, he has switched the black-letter question from “have you been speeding?” to a 
moral question of “are you a speeder?”  Self-evidently, for Jim, the answer to the latter question 
is no (although the fact he has been penalised on two occasions for speeding might suggest 
otherwise), and thus cocoon’s him from the ‘ontological insecurity’ (Giddens, 1991) of being found 
wanting by the law whilst maintaining a law-abiding identity. 
The following driver likewise has difficulty conceptualising his character as non-law-abiding 
despite readily admitting breaking the law. 
I’ve got fined going through lights… I was changing lanes …with three lanes and various 
lights… [I was] right behind a coach that had clearly gone through the lights as it was 
changing... my view was blocked… [I] really couldn’t stop. And of course, it was one of 
the places with the camera on it so I felt hard done by because I’m a law-abiding driver 
but I seem to have broken the law (‘Noel’, Mid 40s, Focus Group) 
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The foregrounding of the debate by Noel is instructive as it indicates the moral reasoning process.  
Noel denies personal responsibility, whereby ‘forces outside of the individual and beyond his 
control’ (Sykes and Matza, 1957:667) are at fault.  For Noel, the fault lies with the law that cannot 
make sense of his offending (or lack thereof) (e.g. driving through a set of lights with no 
opportunity to do otherwise).  Noel sees, and justifies, his actions because he feels he has not 
engaged in morally blameworthy activity, i.e. deliberately driving through the lights.  Only in the 
case of deliberate action could Noe’ see himself as non-law-abiding.  
A further complaint that recipients make, in relation to common-sense justice, regards the 
purposes (and fairness) of enforcement tactics.  
…in a 30 (mph zone) for me to have done that so quickly (reduced her speed from the 
50-mph zone she had come from) … I felt I would have caused an accident, because you 
would literally have to … slam your brakes down straight away. (‘Daisy’, Mid 50s, Focus 
Group)  
…it is tucked away [speed camera} and it is all surreptitious and it gives of the sense that 
somebody is trying to trick you (‘Raquel’, Late 30s, Interview) 
The lack of common-sense judgement here is perceived to involve underhand tactics by the 
enforcement agency who are deemed to be surreptitiously catching people rather than ensuring 
road safety.  No doubt Sykes and Matza (1957) would characterise this as condemning the 
condemners, however these recipients are also appealing to a certain telos in road safety 
enforcement, the concept of harm rather than risk.   
Risk is a technique of control that ‘instead of seeking to bring individuals closer to an established 
norm through the application of corrective interventions…alters the physical and social structures 
within which individuals behave’ (O’Malley, 2010: 323).  In the motoring context, the telos for 
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enforcement officers is the punishment of the risk of harm, rather than the harm itself.  The 
recipients above are challenging this teleological interpretation, and claiming that the practice of 
law enforcement is not promoting the telos of motoring legislation, the actual reduction of harm.  
Both Daisy and Raquel feel they have been “caught out”; targeted not because they were causing 
harm, but because the enforcement agency were purposefully targeting normal drivers in order 
to lower the overall risk.  Authorities may be correct to claim that there are good reasons for this 
approach in that actual harms may be prevented, however, the consequence is that recipients 
feel aggrieved about not having aspects of good driving behaviour (i.e. non-harmful driving) taken 
into consideration.   
This form of moral reasoning relates to Sandel’s second conception of the Aristotelian approach: 
justice as honourific. ‘To reason about the telos of a practice ...is, at least, to reason or argue 
about what virtues it should honor and reward’ (Sandel, 2009: 186).  The recipients below are 
contending that the OTSP fails to honour important moral dimensions of their status and 
character. 
I said that to the copper…, ‘all the way here I have not seen one of you… you have got 
idiots on the road there that get away with it and I am a family-man taking my kids to 
somewhere we have never been before for a good day out and you have just spoilt it. 
(‘Rob’, Early 40s, Focus Group) 
Of course I’m peeved. For half a second [he had driven through a red light] and 50 years 
driving it’s not bad going is it? …I was peeved and I still am now to be honest... (‘Jeff’, 
Late 60s, Focus Group) 
This motorist suggests a desire to have the virtue of 50 years clean driving experience honoured 
by the enforcement agency before automatically issuing the OTSP.  Likewise, the idea that a 
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recipient is a respectable member of society, ‘a family man’, is a request that the law considers 
this honorific aspect of identity which dissociates him from the “real criminals” who are deserving 
of this form of treatment. 
Thus, moral reasoning and issues of “common-sense justice” dominate citizens thinking about 
their own non-law-abiding behaviour.  This reasoning serves an important purpose in maintaining, 
and reinforcing, one’s identity as law-abiding.  Although the recipient may have broken the law 
they can interpret their actions in such a way that the fault lies with the enforcement agency not 
enforcing laws in an appropriate manner (or against the appropriate targets), rather than with 
themselves.   
Whilst Sykes and Matza may see this behaviour as an attempt to minimise the harm of their 
actions, it is contended that it is an attempt to understand an amoral legal framework in moral 
terms.  The common-sense justice claim is an attempt, morally, to justify why being found 
breaking the law is not a bar on being law-abiding.  The law for these citizens is understood 
through a reasoning process that attempts to fill the blank of legal knowledge with the more certain 
foundations of moral reasoning.  The distinction between “law-breaker” and “law-abider” is 
anything but easy and the recipients analysed above are seeking nuance in the interpretation of, 
and their relationship with, the law.  Seen in such a light law-abidance is a subjective experience, 
one in which internalised norms, influenced by the telos of legislative requirements, act as 
substitutes for the objective dilemma of non-law-abidance. Thus the “law” in “law-abiding” is not 
the law of statutes and case law, but an implied law that challenges the “black-letter” interpretation 
of enforcement authorities. Common-sense law is law that is sensitive to moral rationalisations 
based on the presumed purposes of the law in question, or the presumed target behind the 
regulatory intervention. 
 25 
 
Conclusions  
The forgoing discussion has demonstrated the problematic nature of law-abidance in an area of 
law that is frequently flouted by a sizeable proportion of society (Corbett, 2003).  The foregoing 
has demonstrated the distinction citizens make between motivations and behaviours.  As 
Braithwaite notes ‘compliance related behaviours are different from motivational postures… [and] 
depart from the expectation of consistency theorists that attitudes and behaviour should be 
related’ (2002:17).  In the OTSP system this incongruence is clear.  All the above recipients were 
motivated to comply with the law, providing the law is interpreted in a way that accords with their 
common-sense notions of what it should be. The problem lies in that behavioural expectations of 
the law are far removed from the motivational aspirations of citizens.  
Studies of procedural justice suggest that fair treatment by enforcement agencies can overcome 
the negative outcomes of those interactions (Tyler, 2006; Jackson et al, 2012).  OTSPs, however, 
present a twofold problem to procedural justice theory.  Firstly, there is the lack of any physical 
interaction between an enforcement official and the recipient and thus any communication, or 
“voice” to use the procedural justice nomenclature, is lacking.  It seems strange to think of a 
“letter” or “notice” communicating ‘normative aspects of experience including neutrality, lack of 
bias, honesty, efforts to be fair, politeness and respect for citizens rights’ (Tyler, 2006: 7).  
Secondly, as demonstrated above, the arguments being made are, due to the strict liability of the 
laws being enforced, immaterial.  Arguments about the “common-sense” nature of the law, the 
social identity of the offender or the minor nature of the transgression are not matters that count 
in determining the appropriate punishment.  The punishment is the same regardless of intention, 
identity or the myriad of compelling reasons that are offered by the recipients.   
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Tyler explains ‘citizens act as naïve moral philosophers, evaluating authorities and their actions 
against arbitrary criteria of fairness’ (Tyler, 2006: 165).  This article shows that such arbitrariness 
and naivety has a rationality to it; it looks at the purposes/telos of the regulations and judges 
fairness against that criteria.  To provide a procedurally fair enforcement encounter, authorities 
would need to engage in all manner of discussions that, at present, are immaterial in deciding 
whether the citizen has abided by the law in question. 
For recipients, their understanding of law-abidance is at odds with that of the enforcement 
agencies.  Both may appeal to the principle of law abidance, but both have different conceptions 
of what that means.   From an objective perspective, the black-letter approach creates an 
incongruence between law-abiding motivations and law-abiding actions.  Citizens are seemingly 
good at the former but poor at the latter.  Enforcement authorities using OTSPs expect compliance 
behaviour, regardless of the motivations of citizens who have transgressed.  Such citizens may 
have intended to comply, accidentally or thoughtlessly breached the requirements of the law or 
deliberately set out to break it.  In the OTSP system each of these underlying attitudes are equally 
culpable and punished in the same way.  The expectation of perfection in relation to complex, 
often counter-intuitive, changing and badly publicised laws (e.g. parking regulations) certainly sits 
at odds with the everyday experience of citizens.  The witnessing of a violation is stripped of all 
its contextual circumstances and becomes a ‘freezeframe’ (Finkel, 1995:319) of the moment of 
transgression.  
When confronted with their non-law-abidingness it is perhaps unsurprising that recipients reject 
the idea of being non-law-abiding and seek to differentiate their behaviour from more egregious 
examples.   What the effect of being labelled a problem for the law is, whilst holding positive 
compliance motivations to the state of law-abidingness, remains unknown and calls for further 
study. 
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Quite how “common-sense” enforcement of legal rules would work in practice is problematic.  
Boeckman and Tyler (1997) sound a note of caution when relying on “common-sense”, they state 
‘[a]lthough there are certainly merits to pursuing commonsense justice, history also provides clear 
examples of injustices’ (1997: 378).  Such examples include overt racism, sexism and the denial 
of procedural protections for marginalised groups (those deemed to be criminals) (ibid: 377-378).   
It should be noted that this research is not involved in determining whether common-sense claims 
are true, or accurate reflections of the researcher’s idea of common-sense.  Rather this research 
examines why such claims are made and what it signifies in the justice experienced by recipients.  
Common-sense justice is used to highlight how complaints about the OTSP system involve a lack 
of a meaningful opportunity for recipients to make sense (in justice terms) of the OTSP encounter.  
Until the claims for common-sense are understood for what they symbolise, rather than for what 
they are perceived to imply, it is very difficult to move debate forward, as both sides (enforcement 
and citizen) misunderstand the point the other is making.  The recipients discussed above are 
not, in general arguing special status based on any protected characteristics.  Instead they are 
arguing that their actions have not breached the rationale underlying the reasons for punishment. 
This article thus contributes to our understanding of the complex nature of the claim to be law-
abiding.  Citizens’ use of the term “law-abiding” is far more nuanced than enforcement practice 
with OTSPs suggests.  Law-abidance is not a functional state of complying with all of society’s 
rules, but a more complex and nuanced issue, involving purposive moral reasoning in making 
sense of “offending” behaviour.  There are clear policy implications arising from this.  If a 
government wants law abidance, then it would do well to reflect on its purposes for introducing 
legislation in its enforcement of those laws.   
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